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We study efficient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems for Ad-Hoc networks via the prism of IPv6-
enabled Wireless Sensor Networks. These networks consist of highly constrained devices organised in mesh
networks following ad-hoc architectures, and as such carry specific characteristics that are not efficiently
addressed by current state-of-the-art. In this work we first identify a trade-off between the communication
and energy overhead of an IDS (as captured by the number of active IDS agents in the network) and the
performance of the system in terms of successfully identifying attacks. In order to fine tune this trade-off,
we first model such networks with the use of Random Geometric Graphs as this is a rigorous approach that
allows us to capture underlying structural properties of the network. We then introduce a novel architectural
approach for IDS by having only a subset of the nodes acting as IDS agents. These nodes are able to
efficiently detect attacks at the networking layer in a collaborative manner by monitoring locally available
network information provided by IoT routing protocols such as RPL. Our detailed experimental evaluation
demonstrates significant performance gains in terms of communication overhead and energy dissipation
while maintaining high detection rates.
IDS, IoT, WSN, sinkhole attack
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things represents the next major
networking paradigm shift both in qualitative and
quantitative terms. Following previous paradigm
shifts - such as Web 2.0, Cloud Computing and the
Social Media - that enabled computers and people
to be interconnected, now things and machines are
able to seamlessly exchange information and data
over the Internet.
The profound impact of IoT is highlighted by
the number of IoT devices being deployed, as
well as the growth of the corresponding market;
a number of studies predict that by 2025 more
than 55 billion IoT devices will be deployed and
around 15USD trillion will be invested in IoT in
aggregate between 2017 and 2025. Furthermore,
IoT has already commenced its adoption in several
verticals, such as healthcare, manufacturing and
critical infrastructureLi et al. (2015). The importance
and critical role of IoT in the modern economy has
naturally made IoT systems targets of malicious
activity, such as the infamous Mirai botnetKolias
et al. (2017) or the case where hackers were able
to affect the steering and braking systems of a
Jeep carRing (2015). It is worth noting that IoT
networks and systems are not only the subjects
but also the means for deploying the attacks (such
as in the case of Mirai). Ironically, the deployment
of such attacks has also been facilitated - among
other factors - by the use of standardised Internet
technologies that have enabled the paradigm
in the first place. Broadly speaking, security
controls can be taxonomised in three layers. At
the first layer (also known as the first line of
defence) lie preventative countermeasures, such
as authentication and access control mechanisms,
cryptographic primitives, firewalls, etc. At the
second layer (also known as the second line
of defence) lie detection countermeasures that
are engaged during an attack, such as Intrusion
Detection Systems. Finally, at the last layer lie
recovery measures and processes for post-incident
management, such as triaging, security information
and event management and digital forensics. Due
to the inherent and particular characteristics of IoT
(i.e. highly constrained, deployed in mass numbers
and their ephemeral availability), the corresponding
cybersecurity measures need to be revisited.
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A considerable amount of research has been carried
out in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) concerning
deployment architectures, detection strategies and
algorithms. However, currently available IDS are
designed for “traditional” computer networks, thus
making strong assumptions about the system the
IDS will be deployed in; e.g. that each node of the
network is powerful in terms of resources, is always
available and that the nodes communicate over a
reliable and high-capacity network. As such, there
is a need for innovative, lightweight IDS that will
efficiently address the IoT paradigm.
Our contribution. A wireless sensor network (WSN)
consists of a set of small and cheap autonomous
devices deployed over an area of interest. The
devices - commonly referred to as motes or simply
sensors - are able to wirelessly communicate with
their peers and, in spite of their highly constrained
nature, to collaboratively carry out complex tasks.
WSNs are a key enabling technology for the IoT and
as such share several common characteristics. For
the same reason, WSNs have provided an ideal R&D
platform for several IoT protocols and technologies,
such as the CoAP Shelby et al. (2014), 6LoWPAN
Shelby and Bormann (2011) and 6TiSCH Dujovne
et al. (2014). In this work we study efficient and
lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems for the IoT
via the prism of IPv6-enabled WSNs.
We first model a WSN with the use of graph-
theoretical means - namely Random Geometric
Graphs (RGG). The RGG model efficiently captures
spatial characteristics of the network that are closely
related to network connectivity; e.g. interdependen-
cies on the existence of wireless links among neigh-
bouring nodes. Then, motivated by how IoT network-
ing protocols, such as RPL, manage and operate
the network, we identify inherent trade-offs between
the communication overhead introduced by an IDS
and its detection rate of attacks such as sinkhole
attack. We investigate this trade-off via extended
emulations and show there exists an underlying
threshold behaviour in the efficiency of the IDS that
is related to the connectivity threshold of the RGG
model. This allows us to conjure that for peer-to-peer
IoT networks, the number of IDS agents that need to
be deployed in order to achieve a high detection rate
is constant and a function of the ratio between the
network area size and the communication range of
the nodes.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents the current state-of-the-art with a special
emphasis on the most important contributions in
Intrusion Detection Systems in WSN. Sections 3
and 4 introduces the proposed network model and
adopted IDS architecture based on Random Geo-
metric Graphs. Section 5 presents the performance
of the proposed system and discusses the simulation
results and the findings. Finally, our paper concluded
in section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Intrusion Detection Systems for WSNs and the
IoT have attracted significant research interest
in the past years; in this section we focus on
the most important contributions in the area.
Coarsely speaking, IDSs can be classified based
on their architecture into systems following a
centralized, distributed or a hybrid architecture.
In centralized IDSs, all relevant monitoring and
detection information has to be reported to a
centrally located base station where sophisticated
detection algorithms are executed. Here, the base
station is considered powerful in terms of processing
capabilities and available memory and energy. On
the other hand, in distributed architectures each
individual network node is running an IDS agent and
in cooperation with other agents in the network, they
collaboratively detect any on-going attacks. Finally,
hybrid IDS architectures demonstrate a combination
of the centralized and distributed architectures in an
effort to exploit and combine the advantages of each
individual approach.
2.1. Centralized IDS Architectures
Moon et al. (2014) proposed a detection method
for WSNs that aggregates the functions of the IDS
with those of the intrusion prevention system. In
this approach, symmetric encryption and oneway
hash functions are used to establish the routing
path between the base station (BS) and other
nodes of the network. Their results showed that
their approach reduces the total amount of required
energy, in some cases quite significantly. However,
this comes at a cost of increased computational
overhead due to the use of a symmetric key.
Midi et al. (2017) proposed an intrusion detection
system for IoT named Kalis. Kalis is placed at
the border router to collect features of the network
and use these to dynamically configure appropriate
detection techniques. The authors claim that this
approach can be applied and extended to new
protocols as it is a protocol independent method
being based on features.
2.2. Distributed Architecture IDSs
Kumarage et al. (2013) proposed a distributed
anomaly detection framework for industrial WSNs
that uses in-network hierarchical processing. The
nodes of the network are first clustered using fuzzy
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c-means clustering, and then run an incremental
model to score local and global outliers. The
proposed method was evaluated both on synthetic
and real data and results showed a better
trade-off to be achieved between achieving high-
accuracy and introducing a smaller computational
and communication overhead to the network.
Maleh et al. (2015) proposed a lightweight IDS
for WSNs that combines anomaly-based detection
(using support vector machine algorithms) with
signature based rules. The authors study cluster-
based topologies that reduce communication costs
thus leading to extending the network lifetime.
Simulation results show that their proposed model
can detect abnormal events efficiently and has a high
detection rate with a lower false-alarm rate.
Zheng et al. (2016) proposed an energy-efficient
location-aware clone detection protocol in densely
deployed WSNs, which can guarantee successful
clone attack detection and maintain satisfactory
network lifetime. Their approach is based on
Specification Protocol Analysis that exploits location
information of sensors to verify the legitimacy
of other sensors in the proximity and detect
clone attacks. Simulation results showed that this
approach yielded high accuracy in detecting clone
attacks and relatively lower energy consumption
compared to other approaches.
Coppolino et al. (2013) proposed a distributed
anomaly detection method for WSNs that uses both
signature and anomaly-based detection techniques.
Their framework is composed of a central agent and
a number of local agents. The central agent employs
data mining detection techniques whereas the local
agents uses lighter detection techniques. Decision
trees have been adopted as classification algorithm
in the detection process of the central agent and their
behaviour has been analysed in selected attacks
scenarios. The empirical results revealed that this
method exhibits low detection accuracy and high
false positive rates.
2.3. Hybrid Architecture IDSs
Ponomarchuk and Seo (2010) introduced a detection
method that uses misuse and anomaly detection
techniques to detect sinkhole and deprivation attacks
in WSNs. This method provisions local agents
that are installed in each wireless sensor node
as well as a central detection agent deployed
at the base station. The local IDS agents are
responsible for analysing traffic flow handled by the
local node, gathering control data and sending it to
the central agent. With such an arrangement local
nodes are able to detect suspicious activities and
to collaboratively contribute to the global detection
process. The authors evaluated their approach
through simulations and noted that a high detection
rate can be achieved. However, the proposed
approach does not consider the highly-constraint
nature of WSN and the limitations it poses on real-
life systems. Raza et al. (2013) introduced an IDS
for WSN that follows a hybrid architecture. Their
solution focuses on routing attacks and consists
of a central IDS module (running computationally
intensive processes) that runs on the Sink node
and a lightweight distributed agent that is deployed
on sensor motes. The proposed IDS has three
main modules: a central module called mapper, a
lightweight intrusion detection module and a firewall.
The proposed solution shows a good performance
in small networks, but it introduces a massive
communication overhead in larger networks. This
is mainly due to the fact that the lightweight agent
is deployed on every single sensor mote of the
network, thus leading to bottleneck phenomena to
emerge around the Sink as the diameter of the
network increases.
The current state-of-the-art on IDSs for WSN
and IoT networks are still resource-intensive and
do not seem to adequately address the highly
constrained nature of the correpsonding devices.
Centralized IDS architectures introduce significant
communication overhead to the network as the base
station (or Sink) injects and receives large numbers
of requests to and from the nodes related to IDS
data collection. Furthermore, in the special case of
multi-hop peer-to-peer networks, bottleneck effect
phenomena emerge in the areas close to the Sink as
the corresponding nodes relay data from/to the rest
of the network. Distributed IDS architectures largely
rely on the cooperation among the sensor nodes,
thus increasing the communication load as well as
energy dissipation. Lastly, hybrid IDS architectures
achieve a better control and global overview of
the network, but currently available solutions also
introduce a significant communication overhead that
increases proportionally to the number of network
nodes.
In this work we focus on hybrid IDS architectures
but we show that by taking into account the specifics
of IoT protocols, such as the ranking mechanism of
RPL, as well as the spatial characteristics of such
networks, the number of required IDS agents in the
network (and therefore the corresponding overhead)
can be greatly reduced while maintaining sufficiently
high detection rates.
3. THE NETWORK MODEL
The paradigm of Internet of Things envisions the
massive and seamless connection of embedded
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systems, smart devices and things over the Internet.
Wireless Sensor & Actuator Networks (WSANs)
apart from being a key enabling technology for
IoT, they also carry several characteristics that are
typically found in several IoT systems. WSANs
comprise of a big number of ultra-small sensor
devices (which we also refer to as sensors),
whose purpose is to monitor local environmental
conditions (e.g. ambient luminance, temperature,
etc) and drive actuators (e.g. switches, valves,
etc.). Each sensor is a fully-autonomous computing
and communication device, characterized mainly
by its constrained nature in terms of available
power supply (battery), its transmission range r, the
energy cost of data transmission and the (limited)
processing and memory capabilities. In this work
we focus our study on WSANs where the sensors
are static and are deployed over the network area
uniformly at random.
As metioned earlier, there is a special node within
the network the so-called sink S, that represents
the gateway device located on the edge of the
WSAN network. The Sink is assumed to be powerful
in terms of computing power, memory and energy
supplies. It is also the device that initiates the self-
organisation of the network.
We consider that the random uniform placement of
the sensors inside the network area is abstracted
by a Random Geometric Graph. Random Geometric
Graphs (RGG) are formed by n vertices that are
placed uniformly at random in the [0,1]2 square.
An edge (u, v) exists iff the Euclidean distance of
vertices u and v is at most r, where r corresponds to
the wireless communication radius r of the sensors.
This holds assuming a disc radio model; two sensors
can communicate with each other iff each one
lies inside the communication range of the other.
Random Geometric Graphs also have an important
nice property: unlike other random graphs, like Gn,p,
edges are not statistically independent of each other.
That is, the existence of an edge (u, v) is not
independent of the existence of edges (u,w) and
(w, v). This property makes RGG a quite realistic
model for WSANs as it captures to a great extent the
communication structure of real networks (at least
their spatial aspects).
More strictly, consider an area A ⊂ R2 in two
dimensional space. An instance of the random
geometric graphs model G(Xn; r) is constructed as
follows: select n points Xn uniformly at random in
A. The set V = Xn is the set of vertices of the
graph and we connect two vertices iff their euclidean
distance is at most r. For any vertex v ∈ V we
will denote by N(v) the set of neighbours of v and
by deg(v) = |N(v)| its degree. Furthermore, we will
denote by ‖u − v‖ the Euclidean distance between
the points corresponding to vertices v, u
In Gupta and Kumar (1998) Penrose (2003) it is
shown that the connectivity threshold for G(Xn; r) is
rc =
√
lnn
pin
(1)
This way, the RGG model provides us with a formal
tool of constructing and characterising networks as
”sparse”, ”dense” or ”normal”. We also later find
that this threshold also indicates the number of IDS
agents needed in order to efficiently monitor a peer-
to-peer, ad-hoc wireless network.
Figure 1: The Proposed Architecture
4. THE PROPOSED IDS
We propose an Intrusion Detection System architec-
ture consisting of a central detection agent located
in the base station and a distributed lightweight
intrusion detection agent deployed on a subset of
the network nodes as shown in Figure 1. The central
agent manages the entire detection process and col-
lects relevant data from the distributed agents. Each
network node that runs an instance of the distributed
agent, monitors and collects data on local network
activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This
implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS agent,
but only a subset of them such that every node in
the network has at lest one 1-hop neighbour running
the IDS agent. In graph-theoretical terms, such a
subset would be a vertex cover of the corresponding
RGG graph capturing the structure of the network.
This also implies that there exists a minimum set of
nodes that are able to efficiently monitor the network
without compromising the performance of the IDS.
This set corresponds to the minimum vertex cover
for the corresponding RGG graph.
We apply the aforementioned approach on the
state-of-the-art IDS for WSN by Raza et. al called
SVELTE Raza et al. (2013). In their work, the authors
consider multi-hop peer-to-peer IPv6-enabled WSNs
running the 6LoWPAN stack Shelby and Bormann
(2011) on ContikiOS Dunkels et al. (2004). They
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Algorithm 1 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: M ← the list of IDS agents nodes
Require: N ←the list of Regular nodes
for Node in M do
for Node in N do
if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank
< Node.Parent.rank) then
Node.fault=Node.fault+1
end if
end for
end for
for Node in N do
if Node.fault>Threshold then
Alarm
end if
end for
develop an IDS following a hybrid architecture that
consists of a centralized module running on the Sink
and a distributed agent running on each individual
sensor node. The centralized module contains the
6LoWPAN Mapper (6Mapper) which is responsible
for gathering information from the sensor nodes on
the network topology. In particular, 6Mapper collects
information on the rank assigned to each node by
the RPL protocol (responsible for constructing and
maintaining a global tree-like network structure in
a distributed manner) which is closely related to
the hop distance of each node from the Sink. This
allows a second component - the intrusion detection
component - to reconstruct and monitor the network
topology for anomalies that indicate an intrusion. For
instance, a sinkhole attack could be deployed via
a compromised node by having this node falsely
announcing to its neighbours a significantly smaller
rank. This would have its neighbouring nodes
assume that its distance to the Sink is much smaller
than the actual one, thus directing all network traffic
to go through the compromised node.
As already mentioned, RPL establishes and main-
tains routing paths between the Sink and the rest
of the network nodes by constructing a global tree-
like network structure in a distributed way; the Des-
tination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG).
The process is initiated by the Sink broadcasting
exploratory messages to its immediate neighbouring
nodes, which in turn reiterate the process to their
neighbouring nodes lying further away in the net-
work. The process is run recursively and eventually
results in each node being assigned a rank that
depends on its actual hop-distance to the Sink as
well as the link quality between neighbouring nodes
(as measured by an objective function, such as the
ETX metric). In SVELTE, the 6Mapper periodically
collects these ranks to reconstruct the DODAG cen-
trally at the Sink in order to monitor the network
against relevant attacks - like sinkhole - by detecting
corresponding anomalies as shown in Algorithm 1;
for example, if the rank of a node significantly devi-
ates from the rank of its neighbours.
While for each individual node the introduced com-
munication overhead may be small (the messages
carrying the 6Mapper requests are 5 bytes long
while each response from the nodes is 17 bytes
long), engaging each individual node in the pro-
cess introduces a communication overhead that is
proportional to the size of the network. This poses
significant scalability issues and adversely affects
the connectivity and availability of the network as in
multi-hop peer-to-peer networks nodes closer to the
Sink also serve traffic coming from the rest of the
network.
They key idea behind our approach is that
networking protocols designed to address the
distributed ad-hoc nature of peer-to-peer IoT
networks (such as IPv6-enabled WSNs) make use
of network information that is locally available to
the nodes; as in the case of RPL. This network
information can be easily shared with or even be
monitored by 1-hop neighbouring nodes. Therefore,
for a given set of neighbouring nodes it suffices
that only one of them is actively collecting and
reporting relevant information to the Sink. This
greatly reduces the number of nodes that need to
operate as IDS agents, thus mitigating any scalability
and performance issues.
In this work we focus on experimentally investigating
and evaluating our approach by extending SVELTE
(the current state of the art IDS for IPv6-enabled
WSNs). In particular, we focus on evaluating the
trade-off between the potentially reduced accuracy
of the IDS in successfully detecting attacks (due
to the smaller number of active IDS agents in
the network) versus the reduced communication
overhead and increased energy efficiency of the
network.
(a) 100% IDS
agents
(b) 60% IDS
agents
(c) 20% IDS
agents
Figure 2: Sparse network
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(a) 100% IDS
agents
(b) 60% IDS
agents
(c) 20% IDS
agents
Figure 3: Normal density network
(a) 100% IDS
agents
(b) 60% IDS
agents
(c) 20% IDS
agents
Figure 4: Dense network
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1. Simulation Set-Up
We ran our experiments using the Cooja Osterlind
et al. (2006) emulator, which provides a detailed
cross-layer simulation for WSNs running the 6LoW-
PAN stack. We consider three qualitatively distinct
network densities as these are indicated by the
Random Geometric Graph model. In particular, we
consider a network area A = [0, 100]2 where n
sensor motes are deployed uniformly at random, for
n ∈ {32, 64, 128}. Following from equation 1, for each
value of n, the corresponding network connectivity
threshold is rc : {18.5; 14.3; 11} respectively. There-
fore, by setting the sensors’ communication range
to be r = 20, we get three network set ups where
r is (a) almost equal to; (b) ×1.5 and (c)×2 the
connectivity threshold, thus resulting in (a) sparse,
(b) normal and (c) dense networks. Figures 2, 3
and 4 provide a visual representation of the various
network densities.
For each network density, we consider five scenarios
where the percentage of nodes acting as IDS
agents is 100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the
total population (yellow nodes in the corresponding
figures). Furthermore, in each case we set 10%
of the node population to act as malicious nodes
(nodes in purple) deploying sinkhole attacks by
exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL. Any
remaining nodes are regular nodes (nodes in green).
For each network configuration we also run a
scenario with no nodes operating as IDS nodes.
For each scenario we create 10 random instances
of the network; this allows us to effectively mitigate
in our simulations any issues that might occur due
to the random network topology (in other words
we sample the space of RGG instances). For each
instance we run 10 iterations of simulating the
network operation for a simulation time of 3600
seconds where nodes generate and transmit data
approximately every second. For each scenario
and each performance metric we compute average
values and 95% confidence intervals.
Our findings demonstrate strong concentration
around the mean and are therefore deemed
statistically significant.
5.2. Evaluation Metrics
In the following subsections we define the metrics
that are used to evaluate our proposed IDS
architecture.
5.2.1. Detection Rate
We define the detection rate as the number of true
positive detections of malicious nodes over the total
number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(2)
5.2.2. Communication Overhead
We define the communication overhead as the
additional volume of data communication introduced
in the network as a result of the operation of the
IDS. We follow the practice of Raza et al. (2013) and
monitor this metric only to the 1-hop neighbouring
nodes of the Sink (the rationale is that any network
traffic will have to go through these nodes prior to
reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the energy
consumption of the said nodes with the IDS running
and with EIDS the energy consumption of the said
nodes with no IDS running in the network. Then,
Communication overhead =
EIDS − EIDS
EIDS
(3)
5.2.3. Total Energy Consumption in the Network
We measure the total energy consumption ∆Etotal
in the network as the difference between the total
available energy in the network at the beginning of a
simulation and at the end. We denote initial available
energy for sensor i by Eiinit and the initial available
energy for sensor i by Eifinal. Then,
∆Etotal = Σi∈n(Eiinit − Eifinal) (4)
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(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 5: IDS detection rate against the number of active IDS agents in the network as percentage of the node population.
Notice that in normal density and dense networks the overhead induced by the IDS is that high that the network gets
disconnected prematurely.
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 6: Energy consumption and communication overhead
for the entire network
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Figure 7: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS
5.3. Simulation Findings
Figure 5a shows that in sparse networks the
detection rate remains as high as 85% for the
scenarios where 100% and 85% of the node
population operates as an IDS agent. However, the
detection rate drops at 60% for 60% of the population
as IDS agents, and continues to drop further as
the percentage of the agents is reduced. This
demonstrates that the IDS performance in sparse
networks quickly drops due to the fact that areas of
the network remain un-monitored. We note, however,
that there is a certain level of resilience for high
percentages of IDS agents.
Figure 5b shows the findings for networks of
normal density. We note two points. Firstly, the IDS
demonstrates a greater degree of resilience as it
achieves high detection rates even for percentages
of IDS agents as low as 40% of the node population.
Second, we note that for 100% of nodes as IDS
agents the simulation was not completed due to the
fact that the network was rendered disconnected
as the motes lying close to the Sink were not
able to handle the increased network traffic. This
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highlights the network strain that even light-weight
IDSs introduce.
This is also the reason why other works in the
literature on IoT and WSN IDS limit their simulation
studies in networks with small populations. Figure 5c
further highlights these findings as the simulations
failed to complete for scenarios considering big
numbers of IDS agents (percentages of 100% and
80%). Also, in dense networks the detection rate of
the IDS remained at very high levels (circa 80%-
85%).
At this point we make another important observation.
For all three network densities, the detection rate
of the IDS starts to deteriorate significantly (and
as shown in 5a, proportionally to the reduction in
IDS agents percentage) once the absolute number
of IDS agents in the network drops below a
constant threshold; in this case below 25 IDS nodes
(corresponding to 32 · 80%; 64 · 40%; 128 · 20%). This
implies that only a constant number of IDS agents
is needed to effectively and efficiently monitor the
network.
This is a very strong indication that the efficiency
of hybrid/distributed IDS for peer-to-peer ad-hoc
networks is independent of the number of nodes but
related to underlying fundamental properties of the
network. Following our network modelling with the
use of Random Geometric Graphs, we conjecture
that this property is the size of the minimum vertex
cover of the corresponding RGG instance. We intent
to investigate this in our future work employing more
formal and rigorous methods from graph theory.
Figures 6 and 7 show that the energy consumption
and the communication overhead introduced to the
network by the IDS is proportional to the number
of nodes operating as IDS agents. This shows the
massive gains that can be achieved with respect to
fine-tuning the trade-off between energy efficiency
and the achieved high detection rate as a result of
using a constant number of IDS agents.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we study efficient and lightweight Intru-
sion Detection Systems for ad-hoc networks via the
prism of IPv6-enabled Wireless Sensor Networks.
We first provide a formal model for WSNs with
the use of Random Geometric Graphs, a graph-
theoretical model to capture the spatial characteris-
tics of WSNs such as interdependencies on the ex-
istence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes.
Then, motivated from the operation of IoT-specific
networking protocols such as RPL, we focus on
network attacks such as the sinkhole or man-in-the-
middle. We identify and try to optimise the trade-off
between energy efficiency and communication over-
head on one hand, and the IDS detection rate on the
other. By levering upon the distributed nature of such
protocols and locally available network information,
we propose a method for IDS that requires only a
subset of the nodes to operate as IDS agents.
We extend the state of the art on IDS for WSNs by
integrating our method and conduct our performance
evaluation via extensive emulations. We consider
various network densities (as these are formally
defined via the RGG model) and show that 1) indeed
the IDS detection rates remain at very high levels
(around 85%) even with a subset of the nodes as
IDS agents; 2) that the required number of IDS
agents in the network in order to achieve these levels
is independent from the network population and in
fact constant ; 3) that the energy consumption and
communication overhead introduced by the IDS is
proportional to the number of IDS agents, therefore
our method allows for massive energy gains while
not affecting the detection rate of the IDS.
In our future work we will employ rigorous graph-
theoretical methods and tools to formally prove the
conjectures made in this paper. We will also work
in providing efficient algorithms for choosing in a
distributed way which nodes should operate as IDS
agents as well as balancing this role among all the
nodes.
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